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Abstract
A decision-maker is said to have an ambiguous belief if it is not precise enough to be repre-
sented by a single probability distribution. The pervasive assumption in game theoretic models
in economics is that playersbeliefs are unambiguous. This paper argues, drawing on exam-
ples from economics and politics, that it may be illuminating, in instances, to model players
as having ambiguous beliefs. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally
modelled. We show that pessimism has the e¤ect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices
under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the e¤ects of ambiguity on peace-making
are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with
multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in
games with strategic complements.
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1 Introduction
An individual is said to have an ambiguous belief if it is not precise enough to be represented
by a single probability distribution. The pervasive assumption in game theoretic models is that
playersbeliefs are unambiguous. This paper argues, drawing on examples from economics and
politics, that it may be illuminating to model players as having ambiguous beliefs. The growing
literature on ambiguity in strategic games1 lacks two important features: First, an elementary
framework of ambiguity in games that can be easily understood and applied by non-specialists,
and second, the treatment of an optimistic attitude towards ambiguity in addition to ambiguity-
aversion or pessimism. In this article we take up both issues.
Ambiguity may be contrasted with risk, where probabilities are known, see Knight (1921). In
fact for many economic or political situations, it is not obvious why decision-makers should know
probabilities. For instance, it is not easy to assign probabilities to threats from terrorism and
rogue states, and the likely impact of new technologies, etc. Nevertheless, for several decades,
subjective expected utility (henceforth SEU) by Savage (1954) appeared to have rendered the
distinction between risk and Knightian uncertainty obsolete. In this theory, individuals faced
with uncertainty behave as if they hold beliefs that can be represented by a subjective probability
distribution. Hence, from an analytical point of view, there was little distinction between risk
and ambiguity.
However early evidence by Ellsberg (1961) suggests that beliefs cannot be represented by
conventional probabilities. Systematic laboratory experiments have conrmed Ellsbergs con-
jecture, see Camerer and Weber (1992). Despite the experimental evidence, SEU proved to be
a successful modelling tool. Important insights were obtained from the distinction between risk
preferences and beliefs, which can be made in this approach. The economics of insurance and
information could be developed in this context. It is desirable to develop a theory of ambiguity,
which is equally suitable for application. The inconsistencies between Savagess theory and em-
pirically observed behaviour have stimulated e¤orts for alternative theories. We believe one of
the most promising of these is Choquet expected utility (henceforth CEU), which involves repre-
senting individualsbeliefs by non-additive probabilities (or capacities), see Schmeidler (1989).
1See for instance Dow and Werlang (1994), Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), Lo (1996) and Marinacci (2000).
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In this theory, individuals maximise the expected value of a utility function with respect to a
non-additive belief, and the expectation is expressed as a Choquet integral, Choquet (1953-4).
CEU is a generalization of subjective expected utility. It has the advantage that it maintains
the separation of beliefs and outcome evaluation, which makes the theory easier to apply in
economics and social sciences.
A key element of Knights work was that people di¤er in their attitudes to ambiguity. The
majority of people tend to avoid ambiguous situations. However a minority of individuals
actually appear to seek ambiguity. Laboratory evidence shows a similar pattern. Most exper-
imental subjects behave more cautiously when probabilities are undened, while a signicant
minority displays the opposite attitude, (see for instance Camerer and Weber (1992)). Moreover
the same individual may be pessimistic (or ambiguity averse) in one situation and optimistic
(or ambiguity seeking) in another. The evidence shows that ambiguity attitudes are distinct
from risk attitudes, see Cohen, Ja¤ray, and Said (1985). Individuals may be risk-averse and
ambiguity-loving and vice-versa.
Most of the work on CEU has been focused on the case of ambiguity aversion i.e., where the
capacity is convex. The generality of arbitrary convex capacities made expositions relatively
inaccessible and the focus on pessimism limited the scope of potential applications. Recently,
Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2008) axiomatised CEU, where preferences are represented
as a weighted average of the expected utility, the maximum utility and the minimum utility.
While a special case, this representation has the advantage of being simple to apply and easy to
interpret. Moreover, it allows for a meaningful notion of both optimism as well as pessimism as
weight put on the best and worst outcomes respectively. We take this model further and apply
it to strategic games.
We model interaction among players in a game who face ambiguity about their opponents
strategy. A player may react optimistically (resp. pessimistically) towards this ambiguity
by over-weighting strategies of the opponent which are good (resp. bad) for the player. We
introduce the concept of Equilibrium Under Ambiguity (henceforth EUA), prove existence and
relate it to Nash equilibrium without ambiguity. EUA is an equilibrium where beliefs may be
non-additive.
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We demonstrate the applicability of our framework and present some comparative static
results on ambiguity-attitude. Specically we consider the impact of optimism and pessimism
in some familiar models from industrial organisation. In a Cournot oligopoly, the worst (resp.
best) outcome would be perceived as a rival producing a large (resp. low) quantity. Provided
Cournot oligopoly is a game of strategic substitutes, optimism has the e¤ect of increasing the
perceived marginal benet of producing more and so increases the equilibrium output. This
decreases prots but increases consumer surplus. In contrast, in Bertrand competition, a good
outcome would be perceived as rival rms charging a high price. In the usual case, where prices
are strategic complements, optimism will increase the incentive for any given rm to increase
its price and hence also the equilibrium price.
Traditionally, it has been suspected that oligopolies are prone to informal collusive arrange-
ments. Scherer (1970) provides many examples from anti-trust cases. The presumption of reg-
ulators that oligopolists collude, suggests that output is, at least sometimes, below the Cournot
level without clear evidence of collusion. Ambiguity-aversion may o¤er an alternative and as
yet unexplored explanation for why competition may be less erce in Cournot-style oligopoly
than is predicted by Nash equilibrium.
In Cournot and Bertrand models, there is scope for strategic delegation. Interestingly, in
both cases, we show that it is desirable for the owner of a rm to delegate decision-making
to a manager who is more optimistic than (s)he is. This result is rather striking since usually
comparative results are reversed between the Bertrand and Cournot models. Already Knight
(1921) argued in his theory of prot and entrepreneurial activity, that entrepreneurs tend to
be individuals who are less ambiguity-averse. Indeed, there is evidence from interviews with
new entrepreneurs that their self-assessed chances of success are uncorrelated with objective
predictors like education, prior experience, and initial capital, and are on average widely o¤ the
mark (?). In a di¤erent study, new life insurance agents who were optimistic, sold more policies
during their rst year and were less likely to quit (see ?).
Ambiguity is not conned to economic situations. For instance, environmental risks are
often ambiguous due to limited knowledge of the relevant science and because outcomes will
only be seen many decades from now. The e¤ects of global warming and the environmental
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impact of genetically modied crops are two examples. Other elds characterized by ambigu-
ity are politics, diplomacy and international security as many recent events in world politics
dramatically demonstrate. To illustrate the potential of our framework we consider a stylized
model of peace-making in section 5. Because no conict is like another, it is hard for the parties
involved for come up with exact probability judgements. Thus ambiguity may play a large role
in conict resolution such as in the Middle East peace-making (see for example ?) or the conict
in Northern Ireland.
In peace-making, ambiguity leaves room for the optimistic hope that peace indeed will
be achieved but pessimistic participants may also respond to ambiguity with distrust in the
opponent. We nd that in our model ambiguity-attitudes can determine the success or failure
of a peace process.
Beside the above mentioned applications, we provide several new general results. For 2-
player games with a one-dimensional strategy space, we show that if ambiguity is su¢ ciently
large, then equilibrium under ambiguity is unique. If in addition the game has strategic comple-
ments we provide new results on the comparative statics of equilibria with respect to optimism
and pessimism. For such games with multiple equilibria we show ambiguity and ambiguity-
attitude can select particular equilibria.
Organisation of the Paper Section 2 describes how we model ambiguity in strategic games.
Then in section 3 we discuss a solution concept for games, where the behaviour of other players
may be perceived to be ambiguous. We show existence and discuss the relationship with Nash
equilibrium. In section 4 we demonstrate economic applications by considering the impact of
ambiguity in some standard oligopoly models. Non-economic applications are demonstrated
by the model of peace-making in section 5. Some general results concerning the comparative
statics of ambiguity are presented in section 6 and our conclusions can be found in section 7.
The on-line appendix contains proofs of those results not proved in the text.
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2 Modelling Ambiguity in Strategic Games
In this section we explain how ambiguity can be modelled in strategic games by non-additive
beliefs. We present the concepts of a neo-additive capacity (a class of non-additive beliefs) and
of an expectation with respect to a non-additive probability, (the Choquet integral).
2.1 Games
Unless otherwise mentioned, we consider a strategic game G = h(Si; ui)i=1;2i with two players
i = 1; 2, where each players strategy set Si  R is a closed and bounded interval. For most
economic applications, it is su¢ cient to assume that agents choose real-valued variables such as
prices or quantities. The pay-o¤ function of player i; ui(si; s i) is assumed to be quasi-concave in
his/her strategy and twice continuously di¤erentiable in strategies of both players. The following
notational conventions will be maintained throughout. The set of strategy combinations will
be denoted by S = S1  S2. A typical strategy combination s 2 S can be decomposed into the
strategy si of player i and the strategy of his/her opponent s i, hence we may write s = hsi; s ii.
The set of strategy combinations of player is opponent is denoted by S i:
2.2 Non-Additive Beliefs and Expectations
Consider an economic agent whose prot may depend in part on the actions of rivals. Here,
ambiguity concerns the possible play of ones opponent. We shall represent individualsbeliefs
by capacities. A capacity plays a similar role to a subjective probability in SEU. In this paper
we shall conne attention to neo-additive capacities, dened below.
Denition 2.1 Let ;  be real numbers such that 0 6  6 1; 0 6  6 1; dene a neo-additive-
capacity  by  (;) = 0;  (S i) = 1;  (A) =  + (1  ) (A) ; ; $ A $ S i; where  is an
additive probability distribution on S i:2
Let u be a utility function which represents the decision-makerspay-o¤s as a function of
the acts of his/her opponent. The expectation of u with respect to the neo-additive capacity ,
is given by the Choquet integral (see Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2008)).3
2Neo-additive is an abbreviation for non-extremal outcome additive. Neo-additive capacities are axiomatised
in Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2008).
3Gilboa (1987), Schmeidler (1989) and Sarin and Wakker (1992) provide axiomatisations for general CEU pref-
erences. Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), Wakker (2001) and Epstein (1999) characterise capacities representing
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Denition 2.2 (Choquet Integral) The Choquet expected value of the utility function ui
with respect to the neo-additive capacity  =  + (1  ) from playing si 2 Si is given
by: Z
ui (si; s i) d = Mi (si) +  (1  )mi (si) + (1  )Eui (si; s i) ; (1)
where Eui (si; ) denotes the expected utility of ui with respect to the probability distribution 
on S i, Mi (si) = maxs i2S i ui (si; s i), and mi (si) = mins i2S i ui (si; s i).
There is experimental evidence that preferences have the form of a weighted average of
the minimum, the maximum and the mean pay-o¤s, see Lopes (1987).4 Beliefs modelled by
neo-additive capacities are easy to interpret. Intuitively, a neo-additive capacity represents an
individual whose beliefs are described by the additive probability distribution . However (s)he
lacks condence in this belief. In part (s)he reacts to this in an optimistic way by over-weighting
the best outcome M; as measured by  and in part in a pessimistic way by over-weighting the
worst outcome m. Ambiguity-attitude is captured by the parameter ; which we shall refer to
as degree of optimism. High values of  correspond to optimistic responses to ambiguity, while
low values represent a decision-maker who is generally pessimistic. The amount of perceived
ambiguity may be measured by , which we shall refer to as the degree of ambiguity.
Denition 2.3 (Optimism/Pessimism) Let  = a + (1  ) be a neo-additive capacity.
We dene the degree of optimism of  to be .5
If beliefs are represented by conventional probabilities, it is not possible to model decision-
makers who lack condence in their beliefs. The ability to make this distinction o¤ers op-
portunities to analyse the impact of ambiguity and optimism/pessimism in economic models.
With neo-additive capacities it is relatively easy to study comparative statics with respect to
ambiguity-attitude.
Neo-additive capacities reduce the technical complexity of the CEU model. Like a conven-
tional expectation, the Choquet integral is a weighted average of utilities. In particular it is a
ambiguity-averse or pessimistic attitudes of a decision maker. There is also a closely related literature which rep-
resents beliefs as sets of conventional probability distributions, see Bewley (2002), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
Kelsey (1994).
4Such preferences have been axiomatised in the context of risk by Cohen (1992).
5Wakker (2001) provides precise denitions of optimism and pessimism in CEU models. Epstein (1999) and
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) provide alternative concepts of ambiguity aversion.
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convex combination of the minimum, the maximum and an average pay-o¤. More importantly,
neo-additive capacities are less mathematically complex than more general classes of capacities.
While only n  1 parameters will describe a probability distribution on a set with n elements,
a general capacity on the same set involves 2n parameters. In contrast, a neo-additive capacity
can be described by just n+ 1 parameters.
The Choquet integral is similar to a conventional expectation since it is a weighted average
of utilities and the weights sum to 1. However the weights are not probabilities but decision
weights. The best (resp. worst) outcome, M (resp. m) gets weight  + (1  ) (M) (resp.
 (1  ) + (1  ) (m)). For any other outcome, x; the decision weight is (1  ) (x). The
Choquet integral is the sum over all outcomes of the act weighted by these decision weights.6
Assumption 2.1 We shall assume that all individuals have CEU preferences and beliefs, which
can be represented by a neo-additive capacity.
Finally, we need to dene the support of a capacity.
Denition 2.4 (Support) The support of the neo-additive capacity,  (A) = +(1  ) (A),
is dened by supp () = supp ().
For the support of a neo-additive capacity we have  (supp ())+ (S i n supp ()) = 1 +
2, which is not in general equal to 1. This can be interpreted as saying that the support of the
capacity is itself ambiguous. This could be useful to model a situation where a player believes
there is some ambiguity about whether or not his/her opponents will play best responses. If
beliefs are represented by a neo-additive capacity then the best and worst outcomes will inuence
choice in addition to strategies in the support of a players beliefs.
3 Equilibrium Under Ambiguity
3.1 Denition of Equilibrium
In this section we present an equilibrium concept for strategic games with ambiguity. Suppose
player i perceives ambiguity about his/her opponents choice of strategy. If his/her beliefs are
6Sarin and Wakker (1998) provide a detailed discussion of the relationship between decision weights and
capacities.
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modelled by a neo-additive capacity i on S i, i.e., with an additive probability distribution i
on S i, a degree of optimism i and a degree of ambiguity i, then the expected payo¤ function
is the Choquet integral,
Vi (si;i; i; i) = iiMi (si) + i (1  i)mi (si) + (1  i)
Z
ui(si; s i)di(s i): (2)
In games, one can determine i endogenously as the prediction of the players from the knowl-
edge of the game structure and the preferences of others. In contrast, we treat the degrees of
optimism, i and ambiguity, i; as exogenous.
Dene the best-response correspondence of player i given that his/her beliefs are represented
by a neo-additive capacity i by Ri(i) = Ri(i; i; i) := argmaxsi2Si Vi (si;i; i; i) :
Denition 3.1 (Equilibrium under Ambiguity) A pair of neo-additive capacities (1; 2)
is an Equilibrium Under Ambiguity (EUA) if for i = 1; 2, supp (i )  R i( i):
In equilibrium, each player assigns strictly positive likelihood to his/her opponents best
responses given the opponents belief. However, each player lacks condence in his/her likelihood
assessment and responds in an optimistic way by over-weighting the best outcome, or in a
pessimistic way by over-weighting the worst outcome. This notion of equilibrium is similar to
that suggested by Dow and Werlang (1994) for 2-player games. Neither notion is more general
than the other, since we allow for optimistic as well as pessimistic preferences, while the earlier
papers allow for arbitrary but convex capacities.
Our notion of Equilibrium under Ambiguity has a close relation to standard Nash equilib-
rium. Indeed, for no ambiguity, i = 0 for all i = 1; 2, this solution concept would coincide with
Nash equilibrium of the game G = h(Si; ui)i=1;2i. Recall that Nash equilibrium can be inter-
preted as an equilibrium in beliefs. Let  = (1; 2) be a (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium,
then i is player is additive belief over the opponents strategy set with the property that any
action in the support of i is a best-response given 

 i. Above we dene an Equilibrium under
Ambiguity as an equilibrium in non-additive beliefs (1; 2). Equilibrium strategies are given
by the supports of the capacities, which are required to be best-responses. If these are singleton
sets, we have a pure equilibrium. If there are several strategies, which a player considers as
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equal best, then any combination of these is possible in equilibrium. For example in Match-
ing Pennies, any combination of heads and tails will represent equilibrium behaviour as
long as both players do not believe that the opponent would favour a particular choice. If
there is no ambiguity, then Denition (3.1) species a pair of independent additive probability
distributions, which is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
There is a second connection between the EUA and Nash equilibrium. Consider the game
 (; ) = h(Si; Vi(; ; i; i))i=1;2i, where  = (1; 2) and  = (1; 2): Hence  (; ) is
the perturbed game derived from G = h(Si; ui)i=1;2i by replacing ui with the functions,
Vi(si; s i; i; i) = iiM (si) + i (1  i)m (si) + (1  i)ui(si; s i); for i = 1; 2. We claim
that any pure strategy Nash equilibrium s = (s1; s2) of the perturbed game  (; ) is a pure
strategy EUA,  = (1; 2) of the game G with degree of ambiguity i and degree of optimism
i; for i = 1; 2. Indeed, for each player i dene a neo-additive capacity i = ii + (1   i)i
that assigns probability i (s

 i) = 1 to s

 i. Since (s

1; s

2) is a Nash equilibrium of  (; ), we
have supp(i ) = fs ig  R i( i). Thus  is an Equilibrium under Ambiguity. This proves
the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1 For any pure strategy Nash equilibrium s = (s1; s2) of   (; ) =
h(Si; Vi(; ; i; i))i=1;2i, there is a pure strategy Equilibrium under Ambiguity (EUA)  =
(1; 2) of G = h(Si; ui)i=1;2i, in which player i has degrees of ambiguity i and optimism i,
and i (s

 i) = 1.
This observation leads immediately to an existence result. In economic applications, play-
ers strategy sets are mostly continuous variables, such as prices, quantities and investment
expenditures. In such situations, pure strategy Nash equilibria exist.7 To extend this idea to
strategic games with ambiguity, we just need to ensure that the best (resp. worst) outcome is
well-behaved.
Denition 3.2 (Positive/Negative Externalities) The game G has positive (resp. nega-
tive) externalities if ui (si; s i) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in s i, for i = 1; 2.
7We shall not consider mixed strategies in the present paper. Even for additive beliefs, the interpretation of
mixed Nash equilibria is debatable, see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). If beliefs are strictly non-additive, then
behaviour, whether in pure or mixed strategies, cannot coincide with the strategies played, since there are no
non-additive randomising devices.
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If there are positive (resp. negative) externalities a good outcome will be interpreted as the
opponent playing a high (resp. low) strategy. Many games relevant to economics have such
a property. Proposition 3.2 shows that for such games EUA can be applied whenever Nash
equilibrium can.
Proposition 3.2 (Existence) If the game has positive or negative externalities, the strategy
sets Si  R are non-empty, compact and convex for all players i = 1; 2, and the payo¤ functions
ui(si; s i) are continuous in s and concave in each players own strategy si for any s i 2 S i,
then there exists an Equilibrium under Ambiguity (EUA) in pure strategies.
3.2 Example: Entry Deterrence
We illustrate EUA by the following example.8 There are two players, an incumbent monopolist,
I, and an entrant, E. If the entrant chooses not to enter, ne, (s)he will receive payo¤ 0 and
the incumbent will receive the monopoly prots M . If the entrant enters the market, e, the
incumbent has the choice of accommodating entry, a or ghting a price war, f . If the incumbent
accommodates entry, both rms receive the duopoly prot d. Fighting entry causes both rms to
sustain losses  L. The interaction between the incumbent and the entrant may be represented
as the following normal form game:
Incumbent
Entrant
a f
e d; d  L; L
ne 0;M 0;M
where M > d > 0 and L > 0.
There are two Nash equilibria (without ambiguity), (a; e), and (f; ne). In the rst, the
incumbent accommodates and the entrant enters, while in the second the incumbent ghts
and the entrant stays out. Based on standard renements such as sub-game perfection in an
appropriately dened extensive form game, it is common to regard the latter equilibrium as less
plausible. Once the entrant is in the industry, the incumbent will make lower prots by ghting
8The example also shows that convex sets of strategies are not necessary in Proposition 3.2.
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than by accommodating.
Now we shall consider how ambiguity a¤ects this example. We shall assume that agents are
purely pessimistic, i.e.  = 0. When there is ambiguity, we nd a new type of equilibrium.
In this, the incumbent does not ght. However entry does not occur because the entrant is
pessimistic and perceives considerable ambiguity about the incumbents behaviour. Consider
the following beliefs: E(a) = 1   E , E(f) = 0, 1 > E > d(d+L) , I(e) = 0, I(ne) =
1   I , 1 > I > 0. These beliefs show a high degree of pessimism for the entrant. In this
case, the (Choquet) expected payo¤ of the incumbent is given by: V I (a) = M
 
1  I +
dI ; V I (f) = M
 
1  I   LI : Hence, a is a best response for the incumbent. If I > 0,
then f is not a best response for the incumbent. Since this holds for all I > 0, even small
amounts of ambiguity are capable of eliminating non-credible threats.9 The (Choquet) expected
utility of the entrant is given by,
V E (e) = d
 
1  E  LE ; V E (ne) = 0: (3)
Thus ne is a best response for the entrant if and only if,
E  d
(d+ L)
: (4)
We interpret this as saying the entrant will not enter if (s)he feels su¢ cient ambiguity about
the situation. Equation (4) says that entry is more likely, the higher are the prots from
successful entry d and the lower are the losses from a price war, L. In Nash equilibrium, entry
is independent of these factors provided d and L are both positive. In our opinion, it is not
implausible that these variables would a¤ect the outcome.
The case of high ambiguity shows how deviations from Nash equilibrium can arise in EUA.
The entrant considers it more likely that the incumbent will accommodate entry and this belief
is sustained in equilibrium. It is possible that such a decision might be a¤ected by ambiguity,
since a rm will usually have much less information about an industry in which it does not
already have a presence. In practice, entry is likely to entail considerable expenditure before
9This is true more generally see, Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), Proposition 5.1.
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any returns are received. By denition, the entrant is not already in the industry. Thus (s)he
may face some considerable ambiguity about relevant variables, in particular the behaviour of
the incumbent. It is not implausible that entrants might react by behaving cautiously and not
entering even if they do not expect the incumbent to ght a price war.
In standard Nash theory, the assumption that the incumbent will be more likely to play
a, implies that it is optimal to play e, which yields the higher payo¤ of d. This need not be
the case in an EUA, if the entrant is su¢ ciently pessimistic. Clearly, the possibility that the
incumbent might ght entry, an event which is not in the support of the belief, inuences the
equilibrium outcome. Such behaviour is not implausible when players perceive ambiguity. If
the entrant thinks that the incumbent will be cautious and accommodate, (s)he may still not
be bold enough, to enter, since a misjudgment will earn him/her an outcome of  L.
Our intuition suggests that (ne; a) is not an implausible way to behave. We suspect, however,
that the degree of ambiguity-aversion depends upon observations. As evidence builds up that
the opponent plays a (or f respectively), condence may grow and choosing e (ne) may become
more likely. With a support notion, which insists that strategy combinations outside the support
do not a¤ect behaviour, (ne; a) can never be an equilibrium. It seems to us an advantage of
EUA, that it opens the possibility to model such testable hypothesis.
3.3 Alternative Notions of Support and Equilibrium
In the literature there have been a number of solution concepts for games with ambiguity, see
for instance Lo (1996) and Marinacci (2000). The key di¤erence between the various proposals
is that they use di¤erent denitions of support.10 Most of the previous literature has explicitly
or implicitly assumed ambiguity-aversion. For ease of comparison, we shall make a similar
assumption here. Although there are a number of support notions, most of these coincide for a
convex neo-additive capacity.
There are two main possibilities. We can dene the support of a capacity to be a minimal
set of capacity one (as in Lo (1996)) or we can dene it to be a minimal set whose complement
has capacity zero (as in Dow and Werlang (1994)). (For an ambiguity-averse neo-additive
capacity, this coincides with the denition we have been using in the present paper.) If beliefs
10For discussion of alternative support concepts see Ryan (1997) and Eichberger and Kelsey (2006).
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are non-additive, the two denitions will often not coincide.
The advantage of Los denition is that all strategies relevant to choice are included in
the support. For instance, in the present paper, the best and worst outcomes inuence choice
but the strategies, which give rise to these outcomes, are not necessarily in the support of a
players beliefs. This would not be the case if we had used the other denition. However the
Dow-Werlang denition has some advantages. Lo (1996) shows his support notion implies that
the resulting equilibrium concept generically coincides with Nash equilibrium. This property
makes Los solution concept unsuitable for studying deviations from Nash equilibrium due to
ambiguity.11 The reason for this is the Lo-support is not itself an ambiguous set, hence players
do not perceive ambiguity about whether their opponents play best responses in his framework.
4 Oligopoly Models
In this section, we shall present some examples of how these techniques can be used to ex-
amine the e¤ect of ambiguity on economic behaviour. These examples will illustrate that the
consequences of ambiguity can be examined without technical sophistication.
4.1 Cournot Oligopoly
4.1.1 Equilibrium Under Ambiguity
First we consider a symmetric Cournot duopoly with homogenous goods. We show that, in this
case, optimism increases competition because it induces more aggressive behaviour. Pessimism
will, in general, have the opposite e¤ect.
There are two rms, i = 1; 2, which compete in quantities. Assume that rm i faces the
linear inverse demand curve pi(xi; x i) = maxf1   xi   x i; 0g. We shall assume that each
rm can produce at constant marginal cost equal to c. Firm i chooses the quantity it wants to
supply, xi, from the interval [0; 1]. If beliefs are represented by neo-additive capacities, a rm
over-weights the best and worst outcomes. We assume that rm i perceives the worst scenario
to be a situation, where its rival dumps a large quantity on the market, driving the price down
to zero. The rms perceived best outcome is assumed to be where the rival produces zero
11 In fairness this was not the stated aim of Los paper.
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output and the rm is a monopolist. Under these assumptions rm is (Choquet) expected
prot is:
Vi(xi; x i) = iixi (1  xi) + (1  i)xi [1  x i   xi]  cxi: (5)
A possible criticism of this model is that the choice of the best and the worst outcome is
arbitrary. However our results remain true provided the best (resp. worst) outcome is below
(resp. above) the Nash equilibrium output.12
The rst order condition for maximising rm 1s prot is,
@V1
@x1
= 11 (1  2x1) + (1  1) (1  2x1   x2)  c = 0:
Hence the reaction function of rm 1 is given by,
R1 (x2) =
11 + (1  1) (1  x2)  c
2 (1  1 + 11) : (6)
Having obtained the reaction function, one can easily derive the equilibrium values of price and
quantity. Here, we illustrate this claim for the case of a symmetric equilibrium13.
Proposition 4.1 In a symmetric equilibrium of the Cournot model, where 1 = 2 =  and
1 = 2 = ; the equilibrium output, price and prot are given by:
x =
 (  1) + 1  c
3 (1  ) + 2 ; p =
1   + 2c
3 (1  ) + 2;
 = (p  c)x = [(1  )(1  c) + 2(1  )c] [ (  1) + 1  c]
[3 (1  ) + 2]2 :
Proof. From the reaction curve; x = +(1 )(1 x) c2(1 +) : Thus x
2(1 +)+1 
2(1 +) =
+1  c
2(1 +) ; which
implies x = +1  c3(1 )+2 : The equilibrium price is given by, p = 1 2x = 3(1 )+2 2( 1) 2+2c3(1 )+2 =
1 +2c
3(1 )+2 :
Consider the following special cases of Proposition 4.1. For  = 0; the rms experience no
ambiguity. Hence, the degree of optimism does not a¤ect their behaviour and we obtain the
well-known symmetric Nash equilibrium xc = 1 c3 ; p
c = 1+2c3 , and 
c = (1 c)
2
9 : In contrast, for
12See Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) Proposition 3.1, for a related result, which does not depend on such
assumptions.
13The asymmetric case where some rms are optimistic and others are pessimistic has been studied in ?.
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complete ambiguity,  = 0; one obtains:
x =
  c
2
; p =
c

;  =
(1  ) (  c) c
22
:
Firms will only supply if they are su¢ ciently optimistic,  > c: With extreme optimism
 = 1 and strong ambiguity about the behaviour of the opponent  = 1, both rms behave like
a monopolist x = 1 c2 ; which drives down their prot to zero.
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The next result studies the comparative statics of a change in ambiguity-attitude on equi-
librium prices and quantities. An increase in optimism will increase the weight the rm puts on
its rivals producing a low output. This increases the marginal benet of producing more and
hence results in an increase in equilibrium output.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose rms face some ambiguity about the behaviour of the opponent,  >
0: In Cournot equilibrium an increase in optimism,  :
1. increases output and decreases prices;
2. decreases equilibrium prots, provided x > 14 (1  c) :
Proof. By inspection, p is an decreasing function of . Since x = 12 (1  p) ; it follows that x
is an increasing function of :
Symmetric equilibrium prots are given by, V = (p (x ())  c) x (), hence
@V
@ =
@x
@
h
p (x ())  c+ dpdx x ()
i
= @x@ [1  c  4x ()] : Thus provided x > 14 (1  c) an
increase in  decreases prot.
Intuitively, more optimism causes a rm to place more weight on the possibility that its rival
will produce a low output. This increases the marginal protability of extra output. Thus the
given rm will produce more. This reasoning is not restricted to the specic demand and cost
functions but will apply whenever Cournot oligopoly is a game of strategic substitutes. The
condition x > 14 (1  c) says that the e¤ects of ambiguity are relatively small, in the sense that
they do not induce rms to produce less than the collusive output. We would view this as the
normal case.
14 It is an artifact of our numerical example that the price would equal marginal cost in this case.
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Comparative static e¤ects with respect to ambiguity naturally depend on the degree of
optimism : The following result characterises this e¤ect.
Proposition 4.3 In Cournot equilibrium an increase in ambiguity,  :
1. increases output and decreases prices if optimism is su¢ ciently high,  > 3c1+2c ;
2. decreases output and increases prices, if optimism is low,  < 3c1+2c :
Proof. Di¤erentiating x with respect to  yields @x@ =
 3c+2c
(3(1 )+2)2 : Hence,
@x
@ ? 0 i¤ ?
3c
1+2c :
The price e¤ect follows because the inverse demand function is decreasing in quantity.
To illustrate this result consider the case where there is no optimism  = 0. By equation
(6), the symmetric equilibrium is characterised by x = (1 )(1 x) c2(1 ) or
1
2
  3
2
x =
c
2 (1  ) : (7)
Assume that there is an increase in ambiguity, i.e.  rises. Then the rhs. of equation (7)
increases. Since the lhs. of equation (7) is decreasing in x (), x must be a decreasing function
of . An increase in ambiguity will decrease the quantities in a symmetric Cournot equilibrium,
as depicted in Figure 1. As rms are symmetric, EUA are intersections of the best response
function with the 45-degree line.
With increasing ambiguity, pessimism reduces the amount brought to market. Intuitively,
ambiguity makes a decision-maker cautious about the behaviour of the opponent. By dumping
output onto the market, the rival can drive down the price. If rms become more concerned
about this possibility, they will reduce output in order to avoid the potential losses.
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Figure 1: Cournot equilibrium with pessimistic rms
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4.1.2 Strategic Delegation
In this section we show that it may be protable to delegate decision-making to a manager who
is more optimistic than the owner of the rm. This allows the owner to commit to producing
a larger output, which is advantageous in a game of strategic substitutes. Hiring an optimistic
manager has a similar e¤ect to giving the manager an incentive to maximise a weighted sum of
prots and revenue, as discussed in Vickers (1985).
Assume that rm 1 has a prot maximising owner who is ambiguity neutral, i.e., has additive
beliefs. The owner hires a manager to operate the rm on his/her behalf. The owner pays him
a wage, which is fraction  of rm 1s prot. The manager has CEU preferences and has beliefs
represented by a neo-additive capacity. The owner chooses the manager to maximise his/her
prot. Firm 2 is a conventional prot maximising rm. The following result nds the degrees
of optimism, 1 and ambiguity, 1, which are optimal for the owner of rm 1.
Proposition 4.4 The prot maximising levels of 1 and 1 satisfy:
1 =
1  c  1 + 5c1
4c1
: (8)
Proof. Prot is maximised where the equilibrium output of rm 1 is equal to that of a
Stackelberg leader, which is 12 (1  c). Thus by Lemma A.1,15 1 1+211 (1+1)c3(1 1)+411 = 12 (1  c).
Cross multiplying and simplifying we obtain: 411c   2c   21c = 1   1   3c + 3c1, from
which the result follows.
To understand this result, consider the special case of a manager who feels complete ambi-
guity, 1 = 1. In this case, the manager should also be extremely optimistic, 1 = 1: Being a
complete optimist, the manager will assign weight one to the possibility that his/her opponent
will produce zero output and will himself produce the monopoly output. This is desirable, since
in this example, the monopoly output coincides with that of a Stackelberg leader, which is the
most protable output. In general, for managers who have a lower degree of ambiguity 1, less
optimism according to equation (8) will be optimal. It is not very likely that a manager would
assign the decision-weight one to the possibility that the opponent will produce zero output.
15See the online appendix.
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Even so prot can be raised by delegating to a manager who is more optimistic than the owner.
From the point of view of the owner, there is an additional advantage of hiring an optimistic
manager. The more optimistic the manager the lower the fraction of the prot, ; needs to
be paid to the manager to induce him/her to work. This second e¤ect also implies that it is
advantageous to hire an optimistic manager.
4.2 Bertrand Oligopoly
4.2.1 Equilibrium Under Ambiguity
We shall now consider price (Bertrand) competition. Consider 2 rms producing heterogeneous
goods, which are close (but not perfect) substitutes. Firm i can produce at constant marginal
and average cost, k > 0. Firm i charges price pi for its output. We assume that rm i faces a
linear demand curve: Di(pi; p i) = maxf0; a+ bp i   cpig, a; b; c > 0, a > k, 2c > b.
Each rm perceives its rivals behaviour as ambiguous and has beliefs represented by neo-
additive capacities. Suppose that each rm perceives the worst case to be where its rival reduces
price to marginal cost. The best case is perceived to be where the rival rm sets a high price
K; which is above the Nash equilibrium level, i.e., K > (a+ck)(2c b) . We require a+ bk   cK > 0 to
ensure that demand is positive at all quantities in the rmsstrategy sets. Hence we assume, a
rms strategy set is the interval [k;K]  R for some su¢ ciently high K.
With these assumptions the (Choquet) expected prot of rm i becomes:
Vi = (1  i) (pi   k) (a+ bp i   cpi)+i (1  i) (pi   k) (a+ bk   cpi)+ii (pi   k) (a+ bK   cpi) ;
which can be simplied to
Vi = (pi   k) (a  cpi) + (pi   k) b [(1  i) p i + i (1  i) k + iiK] :
Using the rst-order condition for prot maximisation, @Vi@pi = a  cpi   c (pi   k)
+ b [(1  i) p i + i (1  i) k + iiK] = 0, one obtains rm is reaction function,
i (p i) =
a+ b [(1  i) p i + i (1  i) k + iiK] + ck
2c
: (9)
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Equation (9) denes a non-singular system of linear equations, hence the Bertrand equilib-
rium is unique. Since K > p i > k, an increase in i will shift rm is reaction curve up and
hence increase the equilibrium price. The price of the rival rm will also increase, since reaction
curves slope upwards. Consider rm 1. An increase in optimism causes it to place more weight
on good outcomes. In this context, a good outcome would be rm 2 charging a high price.
Since the model exhibits strategic complementarity, this gives rm 1 an incentive to increase
its price. This discussion is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5 If rm i perceives its opponents price policy to be ambiguous,  > 0; then in
Bertrand oligopoly an increase in optimism, i; of rm i causes both rms to set higher prices
in equilibrium.
In contrast to the Cournot case, this result does not depend on symmetry of the rms. On the
other hand, the comparative static e¤ect of an increase in ambiguity  depends on the degree of
optimism of both rms in equilibrium. Assuming the rms have similar attitudes to ambiguity,
1 = 2 =: ; and feel the same degree of ambiguity, 1 = 2 =: ; it is straightforward to
compute the EUA of the Bertrand game as:
p =
a+ ck + b [K + (1  )k]
2c  (1  )b : (10)
Notice that for  = 0; one obtains the usual Nash equilibrium of Bertrand oligopoly, pB = a+ck2c b :
In order to investigate the comparative static e¤ect of an increase in ambiguity, it is useful to
rewrite equation (10) as follows:
p =

2c  b
2c  b+ b

pB +

b
2c  b+ b

[K + (1  )k] :
The equilibrium price of the symmetric EUA is a weighted average of the usual Bertrand
equilibrium price pB; and the best and worst price policy of the opponent [K + (1  )k] :
The less ambiguity a rm perceives about the opponent the closer is its behaviour to the Nash
equilibrium. On the other hand, the more ambiguous the rm is, the more its price will be
determined by its optimistic or pessimistic view of the opponents behaviour. The weight
2c b
2c b+b is clearly decreasing in : Hence an increase in ambiguity will shift more weight to
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the ambiguity attitude [K + (1  )k] : Whether such a shift will increase or decrease the
equilibrium price will depend upon whether pB is larger or smaller than [K + (1  )k] :
Proposition 4.6 In a symmetric EUA of the Bertrand game, an increase in ambiguity  about
the other rms price policy will increase (resp. decrease) the equilibrium price p if  >  (resp.
 < ), where  = p
B k
K k .
Figure 2 illustrates the result of Proposition 4.6 for the case of pure pessimism,  = 0: An
increase in ambiguity causes the best-response function to shift down and the slope to decrease.
Firms have their own markets in which to react to the others price. Uncertainty about the
other price is equivalent to uncertainty about a rms own demand. The lower a given rm sets
the price, the smaller the market the opponents will face. Firmsconcern about low demand in
their respective market, provides an incentive for charging lower prices than in a conventional
(Bertrand) equilibrium. Hence, pessimism tends to increase the competitiveness of Bertrand
markets. For rms which are su¢ ciently optimistic, the comparative statics are reversed, as
illustrated in gure 3.
In Bertrand oligopoly there is also a strategic advantage from delegating decisions to an
optimistic manager. This can be seen from equation (9), which shows that an increase in i
will increase the equilibrium prices of both rms. In Bertrand oligopoly, a given rm can gain
a strategic advantage by committing to price above the equilibrium level, see Fershtman and
Judd (1987). This causes rivals to raise their prices, which gives the rst rm an indirect benet
since its prots are higher the greater the prices of its rivals. Appointing an optimistic manager
would be one way to commit to a high price and hence increase prots.
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Figure 2: Bertrand equilibrium with pessimistic rms
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5 Peace-Making
We believe that throughout social sciences there are many natural applications for our formal
framework of ambiguity, since game theory can be applied in many non-economic contexts. To
illustrate this point, we next consider a model of peace-making. This model also allows us to
study the impact of ambiguity in a game with multiple equilibria.16
5.1 A Peace-Making Game
Consider two players i = 1; 2 interpreted as the parties involved in a conict. Each player i
chooses a strategy si 2 Si = [0; 1]. We interpret si = 0 as no e¤ort, whereas si = 1 corresponds to
individual i making the highest possible e¤ort to establish peace. Higher values of si correspond
to greater peace-making e¤orts by individual i. We assume that benets from peace-making
have the following form:
b (s1; s2) =
8><>:
1 if s1 = s2 = 1;
" (s1 + s2)
2 otherwise;
(11)
where 0 < " < 14 : The benets from peace making are increasing in the e¤orts of both parties,
hence there are positive externalities. An e¤ort towards peace by one party brings benets
to both. The benet function is convex, which implies there is strategic complementarity in
peace-making. The more e¤ort is supplied by one party, the greater the marginal benet of
peace-making for the other. The discontinuity at h1; 1i indicates that there is a qualitative
di¤erence between peace and a war of very low intensity.
Peace-making can be costly. For example, decision makers may face political pressure and/or
threats from extremists in their own camp. For simplicity we assume the costs are linear csi,
c > 0. The payo¤ function u of either party i = 1; 2 is written,
ui (si; sj) = b (si; sj)  csi: (12)
16This example also shows that continuous payo¤ functions are not necessary in Proposition 3.2.
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This game is denoted by GP = h(Si; ui)i=1;2i. Peace is viewed as a public good produced
with increasing returns to scale. The following result characterises the Nash equilibria of the
peace game. This is the benchmark without ambiguity.
Proposition 5.1 Solutions without ambiguity of the peace-making game GP , are characterised
as follows:
1. if " > c, then full peace-making e¤ort is the strictly dominant strategy for i = 1; 2;
2. if 1   " > c > " then there exist two Nash equilibria in pure strategies one with full
peace-making e¤ort and one where no e¤ort is supplied by either party;17
3. if c > 1  ", then no e¤ort is the strictly dominant strategy for i = 1; 2.
Case (3) describes a situation where each side views the benets of peace as being less than
the costs of peace-making, regardless of what the other party does. Consequently peace is not
established. Such a situation would arise if benets from peace are small compared to costs of
peace-making e¤orts. This does not seem a realistic representation of situations such as in the
Middle East or Northern Ireland, where it seems most people perceive peace as worth achieving
if possible.
Case (1) is the non-problematic case. Benets from e¤orts toward peace are always strictly
larger than the costs. Hence both parties provide full e¤ort and peace is established. Again
this does not appear to be a reasonable model of a conict situation in which peace is di¢ cult
to achieve.
Case (2) is the interesting intermediate case. There are substantial benets from peace but
benets from intermediate peace-making e¤orts are not enough to justify the costs. This seems
to t the circumstances in many peace processes. Two Nash equilibria in pure strategies arise,
one in which the conict ends because both parties engage in full peace-making e¤orts and one
in which no e¤ort is made and hence peace is not achieved.
17There is also a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies where parties mix between zero and full peace-making
e¤ort.
25
5.2 Peace-Making with Ambiguity
Now we study the impact of ambiguity on peace-making. The following proposition shows more
optimism makes a successful peace process more likely. In the case where Nash equilibrium is
not unique, ambiguity can play a role in equilibrium selection. If the degree of optimism is
su¢ ciently high, there is a unique equilibrium in which the peace process succeeds. Pessimism
has the opposite e¤ect. If there is enough pessimism, peace will not be established.
Proposition 5.2 The impact of ambiguity in the peace-making game, GP , is as follows:
1. if " > c, then any in equilibrium under ambiguity both parties make full e¤ort towards
establishing peace, i.e., si = 1, i = 1; 2;
2. if 1   " > c > ", then any equilibrium under ambiguity involves only strategies si = 1
or si = 0, i = 1; 2. Moreover, there exists  (resp. ) such that if  >  (resp.
 (1  ) > ) then si = 1 (resp. si = 0) is the unique equilibrium strategy for i = 1; 2;
3. If c > 1   ", then in any equilibrium under ambiguity neither party puts any e¤ort into
peace-making, i.e., si = 0, i = 1; 2.
We believe that case (2) is the relevant one when peace-making poses a serious political
problem. It is in this case, that ambiguity makes a di¤erence. If the degree of ambiguity, ;
is su¢ ciently high and agents are pessimistic (i.e.  is low) peace-making e¤orts will break
down. On the other hand, high ambiguity and optimism (or more condence in the actions of
the other side) can cause the peace-process to be successful.
6 General Results
In this section we present some more general results for 2-player games with strategic com-
plements. We consider a game with 2-players, i = 1; 2: In particular let Si = [si; si]  R for
i = 1; 2 and S = S1  S2. Player i has a concave utility function ui (s1; s2) and has beliefs on
S i represented by a neo-additive capacity i = ii + (1  i)i. The following assumption is
maintained throughout this section.
Assumption 6.1 (Strict Concavity) For all s1; s2 2 S, ui11 (s1; s2) < 0, i = 1; 2.
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Proposition 6.1 (Uniqueness) Under Assumption 6.1 and positive or negative externalities,
if the amount of ambiguity perceived by player i, i is su¢ ciently large then the equilibrium
under ambiguity is unique.
This may be explained as follows. If a given player believes his/her opponentsbehaviour
to be more ambiguous, then that players behaviour becomes less responsive to changes in
their strategies. Thus the best-response functions become atter, which results in a unique
equilibrium. Next we investigate the comparative statics of changing ambiguity attitudes. To
get unambiguous results we assume strategic complementarity.
Assumption 6.2 (Strategic Complementarity) The game G has strategic complements, if
ui12 (s1; s2) > 0, for i = 1; 2.
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Strategic complementarity says that if a given player increases his/her strategy this raises
the marginal benet to his/her opponents of increasing their own strategies. If a given player
becomes more optimistic (s)he will place higher weight on good outcomes. If there are positive
externalities a good outcome will be interpreted as the other player playing a high strategy. In
the presence of strategic complementarity the given player has an incentive to increase his/her
strategy. If equilibrium is unique, an increase in optimism will increase equilibrium strategies of
both players. If equilibrium is not unique we get a similar result. The set of equilibria increases,
in the sense that the strategies played in the highest and lowest equilibria increase.
Proposition 6.2 (Comparative Statics) Under Assumptions 6.2 and positive externalities
the strategies of both players in the highest and lowest equilibria are increasing functions of 1
and 2.
We obtain following corollary from Propositions 6.1 and 6.2:
Corollary 6.1 (Equilibrium Selection) Under Assumptions 6.2 and positive externalities,
if ii is su¢ ciently large, then equilibrium is unique and is larger than the largest equilibrium
without ambiguity. If i (1  i) is su¢ ciently large, then equilibrium is unique and is smaller
than the smallest equilibrium without ambiguity.
18As usual ui12 denotes
@2ui
@s1@s2
, etc.
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Thus ambiguity can act to select equilibria. Under positive externalities, if there is a high
degree of ambiguity and agents are su¢ ciently optimistic, all will focus on an equilibrium
in which high strategies are played. The assumption of positive externalities and strategic
complementarity implies that the highest equilibrium is Pareto superior. In this case, optimism
would select the equilibrium with the highest level of economic activity. As usual, pessimism
has the opposite e¤ect. If there are negative externalities the comparative statics are reversed.
For instance, an increase in optimism would tend to reduce equilibrium strategies.
Without further assumptions, Proposition 6.2 can not directly be extended to games with
strategic substitutes, i.e., games for which ui12 (s1; s2) < 0, even in the case of two players.
Although one can show that for positive externalities, best-response strategies decrease in the
degree of optimism, the change of equilibrium depends on the relative shift of those best-
responses correspondences.
It is worth noting that ambiguity and ambiguity-attitude have distinct comparative static
e¤ects. Increases in ambiguity, as measured by ; cause multiple equilibria to collapse into a
single equilibrium, while ambiguity-attitude, as measured by ; causes the equilibrium strategies
to rise or fall.
7 Concluding Discussion
We introduce a simple model of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it can be applied to
many situations of interest in economics and social sciences. New results are derived for both,
optimistic as well as pessimistic attitudes towards ambiguity. The applications here were chosen
to represent cases of strategic substitutes (Cournot equilibrium), strategic complements with a
unique equilibrium (Bertrand equilibrium) and strategic complements with multiple equilibria
(peace-making).19
Some related results can be found in Eichberger and Kelsey (2002). The present paper ex-
tends those results since they apply to optimistic as well as pessimistic attitudes to ambiguity.
This has enabled us to establish comparative static results demonstrating the e¤ects of varying
ambiguity and ambiguity-attitude independently. In addition the present paper has continu-
19Extensions to more than two players are possible but introduce technical complications concerning the product
capacity, see Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) and Eichberger and Kelsey (2002).
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ous rather than discrete strategy spaces. Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) conned attention to
symmetric equilibria of symmetric games, assumptions not used in our paper. Moreover, they
established uniqueness of equilibrium with a high degree of ambiguity only when a restrictive
assumption was satised (Assumption 3.2 of Eichberger and Kelsey (2002)). The results in
Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) are proved for general pessimistic CEU preferences. They pro-
vide some further applications. For example, in a model of voluntary contributions to public
goods it is shown that ambiguity increases the provision of public goods.
We believe that our approach is simple and intuitive in order to be applicable to various
problems in economics and social sciences. The applications, presented in this paper, can only
serve to illustrate the type of results which one can expect to obtain by including ambiguity
in economic analysis. Our intuition suggests that the conclusions obtained are not unreason-
able. So far, there exists experimental evidence mainly for the impact of ambiguity-aversion on
individual decision making, see for instance Kilka and Weber (2001). However experimental ev-
idence that ambiguity does a¤ect behaviour in games can be found in ? and Eichberger, Kelsey,
and Schipper (2007). The present paper provides some testable hypotheses. For instance we
show that ambiguity has the opposite e¤ect in games of strategic complements and substitutes.
Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2007) nd some support for this hypothesis.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material (the Appendix) is available on-line at the OUP website.
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A.1 Existence
Proof of Proposition 3.2 By Proposition 3.1, it su¢ ces to show that a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of the game   (; ) exists. By standard arguments, i.e., Glicksberg (1952),
  (; ) has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if for i = 1; 2, Si is a non-empty compact convex
subset of an Euclidian space and Vi is continuous in s and quasi-concave in si. We need to show
that Vi is quasi-concave in si, all other properties are straightforward.
Since G has positive externalities, ui is continuous in s and S i  R is non-empty and
compact, we have for any s00i 2 Si that maxS i 2 argmaxs i2S i ui(s00i ; s i) and minS i 2
argmins i2S i ui(s00i ; s i). Together with ui being concave in si for each s i 2 S i, it follows
that Mi and mi are concave in si. Finally, note that for any i; i with 0 6 i 6 1 and
0 6 i 6 1; Vi is a positively weighted sum of functions concave in si, which implies that Vi
itself is concave in si. The proof for negative externalities is similar.
A.2 Oligopoly
Lemma A.1 Assume that the manager of rm 2 perceives no ambiguity (i.e., 2 = 0); while
the manager of rm 1 is not necessarily ambiguity neutral. Then under Cournot quantity
competition, the equilibrium output of rm 1 is given by: x1 =
1 1+211 (1+1)c
3(1 1)+411 :
Proof. From equation (6), rm 1s (resp. 2s) reaction function is given by, R1 (x2) =
11+(1 1)(1 x2) c
2(1 1+11) ; (resp. R
2 (x1) =
1 c x1
2 ). Solving for equilibrium in the usual way we ob-
tain: x1 =
211+(1 1)(1+c+x1) 2c
4(1 1+11) or
h
4(1 1+11) (1 1)
4(1 1+11)
i
x1 =
1 1+211 (1+1)c
4(1 1+11) ; from which
the result follows.
Lemma A.2 Provided K > 10+9k14 ; in Example 2 the optimal value of 1 is
1 =
10  5k
56K   38  37k > 0: (13)
Proof. By equation (9), rm 2s reaction function is given by p2 = 2+p1+2k4 : Firm 1s reaction
function is given by p1 =
2+2k+1K+(1 1)p2
4 (after substituting 1 = 1). Solving for equilibrium,
p1 =
8+8k+41K+(1 1)(2+2k)+(1 1)p1
16 : Hence p1 =
8+8k+41K+(1 1)(2+2k)
16 (1 1) :
Prot is maximised when the equilibrium price is equal to the price which would be chosen
by a price leader without ambiguity. Hence 8+8k+41K+(1 1)(2+2k)16 (1 1) =
10+9k
14 : Solving for 1 :
112 + 112k + 561K + 28 (1  1) (1 + k) = 160   10 (1  1) + 144k   9k (1  1) simplifying,
561K   138  137k = 10  5k; from which the result follows.
Note that 56K   38   37k > 56  10+9k14    38   37k = 2   k > 0, since 2 = a > k. (Recall
10+9k
14 is the output a price leader would choose.)
2
A.3 Peace-making
Proof of Proposition 5.1 Since b is convex, any partys best response is either si = 0 or
si = 1.
Case (1) If s2 6= 1, u(1; s2)  u(s1; s2) = " (1 + s2)2   c 
h
" (s1 + s2)
2   cs1
i
= (1  s1) [" (1 + s1 + 2s2)  c] > 0, since, by assumption, " > c. The case s2 = 1 can be
covered as follows: u(1; 1)   u(s1; 1) = 1   c  
h
" (s1 + 1)
2   cs1
i
= (1  4") + 2" (1  s1) +
"
 
1  s21
  c (1  s1) = (1  4") + (1  s1) [2"+ " (s1 + 1)  c] > 0 since " > c.
Case (2) To show that s1 = s2 = 1 is a Nash equilibrium, by convexity of b it is enough
to show u(1; 1) > u(0; 1). This holds since, u(1; 1)   u(0; 1) = 1   "   c > 0. Now u(0; 0) = 0,
u(1; 0) = "  c 6 0, by assumption, which implies that s1 = s2 = 0 is also a Nash equilibrium.
Case (3) If s1 6= 1, u(0; s2)  u(s1; s2) = cs1   "
 
2s1s2 + s
2
1

> c  3" > 0, since c > 1  "
implies c > 34 > 3". The remaining case follows since u(1; 1)  u(0; 1) = 1  "  c < 0.
Proof of Proposition 5.2 Cases (1) and (3) follow from Proposition 5.1 and the obser-
vation that CEU preferences respect strict dominance.
Case (2) By convexity the only best responses can be 0 or 1. Without loss of generality
consider player 1. Assume that his/her beliefs are represented by a neo-additive-capacity  =
 + (1  ). Let V (1) (resp. V (0)) denote his/her (Choquet) expected utility if (s)he
chooses 1 (resp. 0). Then, V (1) =  (1  c) +  (1  ) ("  c) + (1  )
h
"E (1 + s2)
2   c
i
,
and V (0) = "+ (1  )"Es22.
Thus V (1) V (0) =  (1  c  ")+  (1  ) ("  c)+ (1  ) ["E (1 + 2s2)  c] : By assump-
tion 1  "  c > 0 and "  c < 0, hence if  (resp.  (1  )) is su¢ ciently large V (1) > V (0)
(resp. V (1) < V (0)), from which the result follows.
A.4 General Results
Lemma A.3 Under Assumption 6.1 and positive or negative externalities, the slope of the
best-response functions is given by:
R10 (s2) =
  (1  1)u112
 
R1 (s2) ; s2

11M111 (R
1 (s2)) + 1 (1  1)m111 (R1 (s2)) + (1  1)u111 (R1 (s2) ; s2)
;
R20 (s1) =
  (1  2)u212
 
s1; R
2 (s1)

22M222 (R
2 (s1)) + 2 (1  2)m222 (R2 (s1)) + (1  2)u222 (s1; R2 (s1))
:
Proof. Let Ri denote the best-response function of player i. By positive externalities, we can
set M i(si)  ui(si; s i) and mi(si)  ui(si; s i) for any si 2 Si. Consider player 1, his/her
Choquet expected utility is given by: 11M1 (s1)+1 (1  1)m1 (s1)+(1  1)u1 (s1; s2). By
3
Assumption 6.1, his/her best-response function is dened by,
11M
1
1
 
R1 (s2)

+ 1 (1  1)m11
 
R1 (s2)

+ (1  1)u11
 
R1 (s2) ; s2

= 0: (14)
Di¤erentiating (14) with respect to s2 we obtain:
R10 (s2) =
  (1  1)u112
 
R1 (s2) ; s2

11M111 (R
1 (s2)) + 1 (1  1)m111 (R1 (s2)) + (1  1)u111 (R1 (s2) ; s2)
:
From which the result follows. The slope of R2 can be derived by analogous reasoning.
Proof of Proposition 6.1 Consider the function, g : S1  S2 ! S1  S2; dened by
g (s1; s2) =


R1 (s2)  s1; R2 (s1)  s2

: The partial derivatives of g are @g
1
@s1
=  1; @g1@s2 =
R10 (s2) ; @g
2
@s1
= R20 (s1) and @g
2
@s2
=  1: Let J denote the Jacobian matrix of g. Then J =0@  1 R10 (s2)
R20 (s1)  1
1A. The trace of J is  2. Thus if the determinant of J is positive, both
eigenvalues must be negative and hence J is negative denite. The determinant of J is
1 R10 (s2)R20 (s1) > 1  (1 2)(1 1)Q
2
2
, since
R10 (s2) =
  (1  1)u112
 
R1 (s2) ; s2

11M111 (R
1 (s2)) + 1 (1  1)m111 (R1 (s2)) + (1  1)u111 (R1 (s2) ; s2)
;
R10 (s2) 6 (1 1)Q , where Q = maxhs1;s2i2S u112 (s1; s2) and  = minhs1;s2i2S u111 (s1; s2).
Since the strategy space is compact, the maximum and minimum exist. It follows that J is
negative denite if 1 is su¢ ciently large. By Theorem 4.3 of Eichberger (1993), this implies
that equilibrium is unique.
The next result characterises extremal equilibria in terms of the slope of the best-response
functions.
Lemma A.4 If the highest and lowest equilibria are interior equilibria, then R10 (s2)R20 (s1) 6
1 at these equilibria.
Proof. Dene  : [s1; s1] ! [s1; s1] by  (s1) = R1
 
R2 (s1)

. By assumption there are no
corner equilibria, hence  (s1) > s1 and  (s1) < s1. Let hs^1; s^2i be an equilibrium such that
R10 (s2)R20 (s1) > 1. Then for all su¢ ciently small  > 0;  (s^1 + ) > s^1 + . Let  (s1) =
 (s1) s1. Then  (s^1 + ) > 0 and  (s1) < 0. By the intermediate value theorem, there exists
s0 2 (s^1 + ; s1) such that  (s01) = s01. Therefore hs^1; s^2i is not the highest equilibrium. Similar
arguments apply to the lowest equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6.2 Let hs^1; s^2i denote the highest equilibrium. Assume rst that
hs^1; s^2i is an interior equilibrium. Since hs^1; s^2i is an interior equilibrium, it satises the rst
4
order conditions for best responses:
11M
1
1 (s1) + 1 (1  1)m11 (s1) + (1  1)u11 (s1; s2) = 0; (15)
12M
2
2 (s2) + 2 (1  2)m22 (s2) + (1  2)u22 (s1; s2) = 0: (16)
Di¤erentiating (16) with respect to 1 we obtain: (1  2)u212 (s1; s2) @s1@1
+

12M
2
22 (s2) + 2 (1  2)m222 (s2) + (1  2)u222 (s1; s2)

@s2
@1
= 0: Hence
@s2
@1
= R20 (s1)
@s1
@1
: (17)
Di¤erentiating (15) with respect to 1 we obtain, (1  1)u112 (s1; s2) @s2@1
+

11M
1
11 (s1) + 1 (1  1)m111 (s1) + (1  1)u111 (s1; s2)

@s1
@1
= m11 (s1) M11 (s1).
Hence
@s1
@1
+
(1  1)u112 (s1; s2)
11M111 (s1) + 1 (1  1)m111 (s1) + (1  1)u111 (s1; s2)
@s2
@1
=
m11 (s1) M11 (s1)
11M111 (s1) + 1 (1  1)m111 (s1) + (1  1)u111 (s1; s2)
:
Substituting from (17), @s1@1 =
m11(s1) M11 (s1)
11M111(s1)+1(1 1)m111(s1)+(1 1)u111(s1;s2)

1 R10 (s2)R20 (s1)
 1.
If the game has positive externalities and strategic complements, then m11 (s1)   M11 (s1) =
u11(s1; s2)   u11(s1; s2) < 0: By Lemma A.4, 1   R10 (s2)R20 (s1) > 0 and by concavity in own
pay-o¤, 11M111 (s1) + 1 (1  1)m111 (s1) + (1  1)u111 (s1; s2) < 0. Hence, @s1@1 > 0, and by
equation (17), @s2@1 > 0.
Now consider the case where the highest equilibrium is on the boundary of the strategy set
and the game has positive externalities. In particular suppose that when 1 = ~1 that the
highest equilibrium is hs1; s2i. Firstly it is trivially true that a decrease in 1 must (weakly)
decrease the equilibrium strategies of both players. Now suppose 1 increases from ~1 to ^1.
The equilibrium at hs1; s2i satises the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
1~1M
1
1 (s1) + 1 (1  ~1)m11 (s1) + (1  1)u11 (s1; s2) > 0; (18)
22M
2
1 (s2) + 2 (1  2)m21 (s2) + (1  2)u21 (s1; s2) > 0: (19)
Since 1^1M11 (s1)+1 (1  ^1)m11 (s1)+(1  1)u11 (s1; s2) > 1~1M11 (s1)+1 (1  ~1)m11 (s1)+
(1  1)u11 (s1; s2), the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are still satised when 1 = ^1. By concavity,
these conditions are su¢ cient, hence hs1; s2i remains the highest equilibrium when 1 = ^1.
Analogous reasoning applies to the lowest equilibrium, other parameter changes and negative
externalities.
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